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The Superfund program is quickly becoming a teenager. Not
unlike many parents, American taxpayers -- both individual and
industrial -- are expressing increasing misgivings about the fruits
of their enormous investments of money and attention. This rising
crescendo of criticism has two basic themes (which are not
necessarily shared by all critics): (1) that a grossly
disproportionate amount of resources have been, and will continue
indefinitely to be, consumed by a problem (ground water
contamination from the dumping of toxic waste) whose actual
importance (as gaged by measures of risk to human health) was
significantly overestimated at the time (1980) of CERCLA's
enactment, and (2) that given the desirability or inevitability of
cleaning up certain sites, the program has operated extremely
slowly and expensively (by any yardstick of project management).
Once viewed as "politically incorrect" (or at least an
unacceptable risk to job security and empire building) and
relegated to the journals of academic economists, the call for
allocating scarce environmental remediation resources in accordance
with a universal scale of health and environmental risk has lately
been gaining the support of more and more respected scientific,
governmental and legal leaders. Bruce Ames, a toxicologist at the
University of California at Berkeley who is widely credited with
establishing standardized protocols for extrapolating human health
risk from controlled animal-model exposures, has notably proposed
a quantitative scale of relative risk utilizing published
toxicological data showing, for example, that the risk of death
resulting from the lifetime daily consumption of one 12-ounce beer
is 700 times that from drinking untreated water from the most
contaminated well in Silicon Valley (with a TCE concentration of
2800 pg/1). (Bruce Ames, "Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards",
236 Science 271 (1989).) Ames has since written a series of
articles attempting to overcome popular journalism's "threat am
lour" approach by educating the public on the large but
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controllable (and commonly underestimated) risks of smoking,
improper diet and drinking. (An excellent bibliography of Ames's
writings and comprehensive overview of the whole risk
assessment/risk management debate appears in a paper by Howard
Holme, Esq., "Environmental Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit
Analysis: Nothing is Certain Except Death, Taxes and Environmental
Risks", presented at a symposium onoApril 24-25, 1991 at Denver
entitled "Colorado Environmental Regulation -- Where is the
Pendulum Now?" (hereafter "Pendulum Seminar")).
Indeed, EPA's own Science Advisory Board has recently
concluded that ground water pollution generally presents a
relatively low risk to human health and the environment, as
contrasted with atmospheric ozone depletion and air toxics, for
example. ("EPA Ground Water Protection Strategy: Where Does it
Take Us", U.S. Water News, March 1992, p. 13.)
Within the context of the national ground water remediation
effort, it is likewise asserted that the allocation of resources is
grossly distorted by the sheer availability of funding to low-risk
problems that fall under CERCLA rather than to higher risk
concerns, such as nonpoint sources, that don't. One commentator
states that "[n]onpoint sources pay 2% of the cost of water quality
control, yet they are responsible for 65% of the problem." (Jerry
W. Raisch, Esq., "How Clean is Clean? A Cost Effectiveness Policy",
p. 3., also presented at the Pendulum Seminar).
Among the most prominent of these nonpoint sources are
pesticides and fertilizers. Ground water contamination resulting
from farming practices is an economic "externality", not unlike
toxic residues from dumps, for which Congress has typically
fashioned some rigorous regulatory oor quasi-market (e.g., air
emissions trading under the Clean Air Act) "solution." : Yet, due
primarily to the o politics of agriculture, 1.5 million rural
dwellers, including 22,500 infants less than a year old, remain
exposed to nitrate concentrations in their drinking water in excess
of the mandatory standard (10 mg/1) which has been on the books for
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nearly 50 years.	 ("Aside from Pesticides, EPA Sees National
Nitrate Problem", U.S. Water News, March 1992, p.6.)
Turning from the "macro" to the "micro" level of criticism, we
start by recalling that EPA Administrator Bill Reilly began his
tenure in 1989 by calling for a "90-day management review" of
Superfund strategies and tactics and for the development of
recommendations for quick programmatic improvement. Rightly or
wrongly, this internal review tacitly accepted the frequently
vague, conflicting and unrealistic mandates of CERCLA and SARA as
"givens" not open to discussion, and focused its attention on
"tweaking" program routines and lowering public expectations. (Am
"A Management Review of the Superfund Program", U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, June 1989.) EPA admits that little in its "new
long-term strategy for Superfund" is "literally 'new', since most
of the principles have begun to drive the program in recent
years..." (Ibid., p. i.). Predictably, even agency veterans such
as its previous General Counsel forecast a continuation -- if not
an acceleration -- of the waste for which the program is notorious
because nothing has been done to address the structural problems of
undue complexity and "muddled" objectives. (E. Donald Elliott,
"Superfund: EPA Success, National Debacle?", 6 Natural Resources I
Hnvironment 11, Winter 1992.) Says Barron's: "The evidence is
piling up like trash: Superfund has generated vast quantities of
paper and vast sums of legal fees, but not much improvement in the
environment." Herron's cites recent studies showing "transaction
costs" at Superfund sites running anywhere from 33% to 80% of total
project costs, with total program costs exceeding $10 billion to
date. These costs are expected, by various forecasters, to reach
anywhere from $25 billion to $700 billion before the Superfund
program is deemed complete or (more likely) the public demands a
reduction in scope or even its termination. ("Superfund or
Superflop? The National Hazardous Waste Cleanup is a Dirty Mess,"
Barron's, May 4, 1992, p. 10.)
For the short term, at least, it is safest to project a
continuation of the status quo: (1) increasing "consciousness-
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raising", but little reform of the political/bureaucratic approach
to allocating remediation resources based on the perceived ease of
collecting those resources from certain sectors of the economy and
in response to the public's misinformed views of the relative
risks, and (2) increasing reallocation of available Superfund
resources to enforcement and administration and away from direct
fund-supported cleanup work under the banners of "making the
polluters pay" and "preserving the integrity of the fund". (ass,
e.g., "Summary of the 1993 Budget," U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, January 1992; Elizabeth H. Temkin, Esq., "Cleaning Up
ARARs: Reflections from the Field," 6 natural Resources 6 
invironment 18, Winter 1992.)
In view of this fairly bleak outlook for taxpayer satisfaction
with Superfund, it might be interesting to take a look at a
discrete project within the multi-billion dollar Rocky Mountain
Arsenal cleanup that is complete, meeting or exceeding all of its
treatment goals, and operating under budget. After describing the
evolution of this project, I will attempt to identify the keys to
its success and -- with the audience's indulgence -- speculate as
to whether these critical success factors are likely to recur
elsewhere and can be capitalized on to improve Superfund cost
effectiveness.
II. History of Ground Water Contamination and Cleanup in South
Adams County Water and Sanitation District.
• 1953 -- 1982 South Adams County Water and Sanitation District
formed by existing residents and industries of
Adams City, Dupont, Welby, Derby and surrounding
areas, primarily to address then-known
Contamination problems (residues from unlined
landfills, unregulated septic tanks, petrochemical
and other heavy industries). Original plan was to
eliminate septic tank contamination by building a
central sewage treatment plant and laying sewers,
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fl and to eliminate known risks to drinking waterquality in the hundreds of private shallow
(alluvial) wells by developing a central system of
few large bedrock (Arapahoe) aquifer wells. Latter
part of plan could not be fully realized due to
lower-than-expected yields of deep wells; resulting
shortage and continuing growth led (reluctantly) to
a return to the alluvium for additional supplies.
Major uncontaminated (by crude methods of analysis)
alluvial supplies were found and tapped at the far
east edge of the District, just across the street
from the Rocky Mountain Arsenal's west boundary.
• 1983 -- DBCP (nematocide manufactured exclusively by Shell
Chemical Co. at the Arsenal) discovered in trace
quantities in one of the District's shallow wells.
Pacing vocal citizen pressure, threats of closure
from Colorado Department of Health, and possible
financial ruin, District encouraged State of
Colorado to . file S107 natural resource damage
action against Army and Shell (Civil Action No. 83-
C-2386, U.S, District Court for the District of
Colorado; Colorado v. United States) just prior to
lapse of original statute of limitation (December
11, 1983).
• 1984-1985 -- Politics and posturing reach full-boil as complex
and overlapping patterns of offpost contamination
are discovered. Liability in the classic sense
becomes very difficult to sort out (due to the
numerous potential sources of geographically-
overlapping plumes, many of common industrial
solvents) and even more difficult to enforce (due
to the insulated status of military facilities
under original CERCLA,	 the vagaries of
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Congressional funding for military facility
cleanup, and the disappearance or potential
insolvency of many offpost contributors). Trace
quantities of DBcP eventually disappear at the one
affected well while trace quantities of several
related common solvents (most notably TCE) are
discovered at several of the District's other
shallow wells.
• 1986-1987 Enlightened mutual self-interest gradually replaces
rhetoric and hard-line legal positions. Army steps
forward and acknowledges a portion of
responsibility for District's contamination; offers
to fund temporary treatment (with rented granular-
activated carbon ("GAC") contactors). District
offers to assume responsibility for installation
and operation of temporary treatment system;
develops valuable treatment feasibility experience
and restores operating credibility with public and
regulators. District independently investigates
and selects desired permanent remedy and presents
overall plan to Army, EPA and State. EPA segments
permanent treatment of , District's water supply as a
separate "operable unit" to expedite action and
issues final record of decision approving
District's proposed permanent remedy (one
centralized GAC treatment plant, to be known as the
Klein Water Treatment Facility). Army agrees to
provide first $6 million of capital cost and a 2-
year-early lump-sum contribution of another $6
million towards plant operations and maintenance
("0 & M"). District assumes responsibility for
detailed design, construction, long-term 0 & M and
financial management, Vsubject to state and federal
oversight.	 (Th
• 1988-1989 -- As committed funds for construction prove
insufficient, EPA and Army make additional
contributions. With many state-of-the-art features
and with great community pride, District opens
Klein Water Treatment Facility in November, 1989 at
a total capital cost (including sophisticated
laboratory, necessary pipeline extensions,
computerized flow management, advanced plant safety
equipment, environmental residue management, etc.)
of approximately $12 million.
• 1989-1992 Klein Water Treatment Facility continuously meets
all applicable drinking water standards with an
additional margin of safety, and operates each year
at a total 0 & M cost below that originally
projected and in each year's approved budget.
Plant receives the 1991 National Grand Prize for
design excellence from the American Academy of
Environmental Engineers. Plant becomes a model for
environmental engineers throughout the U.S. and
receives professionals from Europe and Australia.
District encourages citizen awareness by sponsoring
frequent guided tours for customers and local
schools. Nine years after contamination problem
first discovered, District has never itself filed a
single lawsuit nor participated actively in any of
the complex of ongoing federal actions addressing
myriad other features of the Arsenal cleanup. Some
funding issues (connection of last 3 wells to
plant, elimination of projected long-term 0 & M
funding shortfall) remain, but are relatively small
in comparison to problems already solved, and
District is confident of eventual satisfactory




• All scientifically-established orisk through drinking water
exposure to 98-99% of the population potentially affected by
Arsenal and offpost contamination has now been eliminated for
over 6 years. Success should continue . throughout anticipated
25-year project life with minor additional funding.
• Total capital cost of Klein Water Treatment Facility ($12
million) would have added about $1.30/1000 gal. to customers'
Water bills if not federally funded. 0 & Pi costs Would have
added another $0.70/1000 gal., for a total burden of about
$2.00/1000 gal. to eliminate ground water contamination.
• District's basic water rata as of 1986 was $1.15/1000 gal.
Hence, refusal of Army and EPA to fund project would have
resulted in near-tripling of customer bills (moving District's
rates from among the most reasonable to among the most
expensive of municipal water providers in the Denver Metro
area). Burden would have fallen particularly hard on
District's large population oelderly, underemployed, and
otherwise-dependent customers.
• While total cleanup costs may appear high in comparison with
District's pre-exist,ing water:: rate structure, they are
remarkably lower than costs experienced nearby (both onpost
and offpost) and nationally forcleaning up ground water to
drinking water standards.
• District's "transaction costs" (as measured by response costs
reimbursed by Anti') were exceedingly low by national
standards: $410,000 total covering a 6-year period, and not
more than $30,000 in any year since.
IV. Lessons Learned.
• Superfund cleanups will be most successful (as measured by
timeliness and cost-effectiveness) when driven by the parties
with the most at stake. 'These are typically the victims and
often the major PRP's, but seldom the regulators, ft 	
PRP's, or outside interest groups. To be successful, the
major stakeholders must professionalize (objectify) and de-
personalize the issues.
• No realistic amount of change in the governing statutes,
regulations and administrative policies will materially
improve the situation of the primary stakeholders within a
useful time frame, so they are best advised to accept the
status quo (however unpalatable) as a given, and attempt to
make the best out of a bad situation.
• No remediation plan, no matter how expensive, complicated and
time-consuming, will ever satisfy anything approaching all of
the interested parties. In a democracy where the right to
take extreme, "non-negotiable" positions is a cherished and
commonly exercised right, it is a waste of time to attempt to
build such super-majorities. Public relations and community
outreach efforts are most valuable in communicating the facts
accurately, consistently and clearly to the interested public,
rather than trying to compete with fear-mongers and
proselytizers. The parties driving the remedy should use
public information resources to maintain adequate support
throughout the course of the project, rather than to try to
"win friends and influence people."
• Litigation is the result of a failure of practical leadership
(from one or more parties) and can seldom, if ever, be
justified by a need to receive guidance from the courts. (No
NPL site has ever been cleaned up by the courts!) The sheer
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cost and unproductiveness of CERCLA litigation opens up a
tremendous opportunity for the parties to fashion their own
negotiated remedies within the broad legal, financial and
technical constraints. Any plan. negotiated by the parties, no
matter how ill-conceived, is bound to be better that the best
plan a remote court can prescribe.
• Contamination victims and major PRP's interested in driving
their own cleanup must, like it or not, assume a fair amount
of political risk and accept the inherent ambiguity of the
situation. Parties longing for greater security than is
generally available in a proactive approach should question
whether they really would prefer to trade-off delay and
additional expense for reduced uncertainty and exposure.
• Pareto's Law holds: the first 80% of the desired level of
progress will take 20% of the available resources, and vice -
versa. Consequently, progress-oriented parties should concern
themselves with optimizing, rather than maximizing, desired
objectives.
(Th
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